| Grant number: | 11/21455-0 |
| Support type: | Scholarships in Brazil - Doctorate (Direct) |
| Effective date (Start): | January 01, 2012 |
| Effective date (End): | May 31, 2013 |
| Field of knowledge: | Humanities - Political Science - State and Government |
| Principal Investigator: | Fernando Luiz Abrucio |
| Grantee: | Ana Paula Massonetto |
| Home Institution: | Escola de Economia de São Paulo (EESP). Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV). São Paulo , SP, Brazil |
| Associated research grant: | 08/03595-7 - Political institutions and public spending: a comparative study of Brazilian states, AP.TEM |
Abstract This research examines the distribution of state bureaucracies portfolios for political parties affiliated. It can be seen as a natural continuation of the concern of the thematic project to assess how parties nominate state secretaries. The main question to be answered is whether the pattern of distribution of portfolios of the second level state bureaucracies is the same pattern of distribution of the state secretariat. The answer will be valuable to understand how political coalitions are formed and operate in the state political systems. As for the president, to form coalitions in a system governed by open-list proportional representation is not an easy task for governors. The multiplicity of parties of diverse ideological orientations causes the governors to negotiate in various ways to create and sustain parliamentary coalitions to implement their agenda.The literature on governance coalitions usually focus on two types of goods used by presidents to cement coalitions: redistributive goods (pork) and own assets of government (coalition goods), and studies on the functioning of coalition presidentialism in Brazil are treated with attention these two types of goods. However, it remains an important gap in the goods themselves from the government. This is the distribution of portfolios in the second level of public bureaucracy state parties belonging to the coalition. This project proposes to begin filling this gap by collecting and analyzing the nominees to render the state bureaucracy in addition to secretaries and secretaries of state. The main point to be addressed is the proportionality in parliamentary occupation of positions of trust: will occur similar to the distribution of portfolios state secretariat? The scientific contribution of this response will not be trivial. Allow to understand how the state bureaucracy is related to the political system, a question that refers to the normative work of Max Weber and Woodrow Wilson and the analytical work of Terry Moe, David Lewis and many other scholars of presidential and parliamentary systems. It will also allow other researchers have a design theme as the finest in addition to the distribution of portfolios of political parties as they relate to the Executive in the states. The result of this relationship to public policies proposed and implemented is quite relevant. The main objective of the project is to analyze the proportionality of the distribution of portfolios in the bureaucracy by state affiliated with political parties. A secondary objective of this project can be measured as the turnover occurs in the state administrative structure, and dialogue with the analysis of ministerial turnover (Amorim Neto, Kaare Strom and others). The turnover in this portfolios operates under the same standards that the state secretaries of turnover? Another secondary objective of the project can be the analysis of the political career bureaucrats. Much is currently known about migration patterns of intra-party legislators at the federal level and its effects on the organization of parties and policymaking. Will the migration patterns of intra-party members of the bureaucracy are similar? The database of party members, recently released by the Superior Electoral Court FGV-CEPESP is fundamental to the analysis of this point. The researcher will answer the above questions based on the collection of data on the occupants of the second level of the bureaucracy of the state of São Paulo, as well as analysis of the relevant legislation. These names will be in a second stage, crossed with the database on party members provided by the TSE. Finally, the complexity of the bureaucratic structure and proximity of sources of information does the state of São Paulo, an excellent case to start such research. (AU) | |