| Grant number: | 13/00543-4 |
| Support type: | Scholarships in Brazil - Doctorate (Direct) |
| Effective date (Start): | April 01, 2013 |
| Effective date (End): | March 31, 2016 |
| Field of knowledge: | Humanities - Philosophy - History of Philosophy |
| Principal Investigator: | Luiz Henrique Lopes dos Santos |
| Grantee: | Tomás Roberto Troster |
| Home Institution: | Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH). Universidade de São Paulo (USP). São Paulo , SP, Brazil |
| Associated scholarship(s): | 15/11858-1 - Induction and science in Aristotle, BE.EP.DD |
Abstract Science (episteme) is understood by Aristotle as a demonstrative knowledge, i.e. a kind of knowledge that can be expressed through a deductive discourse (logos) based on assumptions which are necessary but indemonstrable. The demonstration, which characterizes science, is regarded by the philosopher as a kind of deduction: a scientific deduction (syllogismon epistemonikon). Deduction (sullogismos) is defined by Aristotle as an argument in which, certain things having been supposed, something different from the things supposed results of necessity because these things are so. Although Aristotle asserts that there can be deductions with no necessary assumptions, the same does not occur with demonstrations. However, the philosopher also says that it would be impossible to prove absolutely everything, since thus we would fall into a infinite demonstration, and therefore nothing would be demonstrated: the first principles of a demonstration will not be demonstrated, but grasped by the intelligence (nous), which method is induction. According to Aristotle, the intelligence is the only thing truer than science, and thus, could be a principle of science. From these considerations, I investigate the Aristotelian arguments on the necessity of scientific knowledge, its principles and its apprehension, since, in its last analysis, this necessity is as indemonstrable as the necessity of induction. (AU) | |