Induction and Science in Aristotle

Author(s)

Tomás Roberto Troster

• Document type: Doctoral Thesis
• Press: São Paulo.
• Institution: Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH/SBD)
• Defense date: 2016-03-09

Examining board members

Luiz Henrique Lopes dos Santos; Roberto Bolzani Filho; Fernando Eduardo de Barros Rey Puente; Rodrigo Guerizoli Teixeira; Marco Antonio de Avila Zingano

• Advisor: Luiz Henrique Lopes dos Santos

Abstract

Science (episteme) is understood by Aristotle as a demonstrative knowledge, i.e. a kind of knowledge that can be expressed by a deductive discourse (logos) based on necessary premisses. However, the demonstrability that characterizes science does not apply to its principles. According to Aristotle, it would be impossible to demonstrate everything, since thus we would fall into an infinite demonstration and, therefore, there would be no demonstration at all. First principles of science are grasped by intelligence (noûs), based upon the results achieved by induction (epagogé), which is the proceeding from particulars up to universals. Starting with an analysis of the formal aspects of science, this thesis investigates the various senses and aspects of inductive processes, trying to show how they and other instruments of thought can provide a safe knowledge that ensures the necessity of scientific knowledge and its demonstrations. (AU)

• FAPESP's process: 13/00543-4 - Induction, demonstration and the ineffable scientificity of principles in Aristotle
• Grantee: Tomás Roberto Troster
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Doctorate (Direct)