The philosophical (dis)interest of correspondence truth theories

• Grant number: 14/04950-6
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Master
• Start date: August 01, 2014
• End date: February 29, 2016
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Philosophy - Metaphysics
• Agreement: Coordination of Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES)
• Principal Investigator: Marco Antonio Caron Ruffino
• Grantee: Eduardo Rodrigues Rêgo de Oliveira
• Host Institution: Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas (IFCH). Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Campinas , SP, Brazil

Abstract

This project intends to deal with truth theories, more precisely with the relations between three pricipal kinds of truth theories: correspondence, redundancy and identity. This work has its start points on an article by David Lewis (2001) in which he discusses the philosophical interest of the correspondece truth theories and from a reply for those very considerations on Marian David (2004). For the sake of a more precise analysis it is necessary to pay attention to the deflacionist and identity thesis since both have significative roles on the construction of the arguments in 2001. In our introduction we'll seek to briefly approach the three more representative theories for Lewis thesis, as well as the objection made by him for each one of them after their presentation (saving the redundancy theory). At the closing of our project the counter-arguments by David will be presented followed by our project's justification. (AU)