Ontological underpinnings of Aristotle's philosophy of science

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Author(s):	Breno Andrade Zuppolini Total Authors: 1
Document type:	Doctoral Thesis
Press:	Campinas, SP.
Institution:	Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
Defense date:	2017-10-24
Examining board members:	Lucas Angioni; Raphael Zillig; Michail M Peramatzis; David Bronstein; Manuel Berrón
Advisor:	Lucas Angioni
Abstract
This dissertation focuses on the ontological underpinnings of Aristotle¿s philosophy of science. His notion of scientific knowledge is committed to a certain kind of foundationalism, which recognizes essences as ultimate explanatory factors. The philosopher distinguishes between two kinds of essence-bearers: subjects and attributes. Our analysis of this distinction involves a study of Aristotle¿s doctrine of ontological categories and his theory of predication. In addition, we specify the roles played by the essences of subjects and the essences of attributes in scientific explanations. As a result, Aristotle¿s foundationalism amounts to the view that reality is composed of finite chains of explanatory connections and entities whose essences are connected to one another in a hierarchical structure (AU)

FAPESP's process:	13/26386-2 - Ontological Underpinnings of Aristotle's Philosophy of Science
Grantee:	Breno Andrade Zuppolini
Support Opportunities:	Scholarships in Brazil - Doctorate