Aristotle's philosophy of science is connected to a conceptual ontological framework that includes the doctrine of metaphysical categories and the priority of substance over concomitant beings. However, such framework was explored in different stages of Aristotle's career and not always with the same theoretical purposes. In the Categories, the philosopher classifies the individuals belonging in the category of substance as beings in the core sense of the term, on which the existence of all other beings depends. Whereas the other beings are what they are insofar as are predicated of a particular substance, the latter holds with its essence a connection that cannot be analysed in terms of a more basic predication. On the other hand, in the Posterior Analytics, the universal species seem to bear a certain (explanatory) priority over their particular members, even in the case of substances. Intending to elaborate an ontology adequate for a philosophy of natural sciences, Aristotle, in some later works as the Physics, starts to describe particular substances as composites of matter and form, which leads him to reject the view that the relation between an individual substance and its essence is not analysable. Finally, such ontology of natural kinds is developed in its fulfilment only in the Metaphysics. By the research proposed herewith, we shall study these ontological theses considering them in their connection with Aristotle's philosophy of science, investigating what kind of parameters they provide to epistemic discourse and the formulation of scientific explanations.
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