Full text
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| Author(s): |
Vinicius Carvalho
Total Authors: 1
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| Document type: | Master's Dissertation |
| Press: | Campinas, SP. |
| Institution: | Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas |
| Defense date: | 2021-08-26 |
| Examining board members: |
Monique Hulshof;
Joel Thiago Klein;
Robinson dos Santos
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| Advisor: | Monique Hulshof |
| Abstract | |
One of Kant’s aims in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals is to identify the supreme principle of morality. This research analyzes the arguments from the first and second sections, which identify the so-called Formula of Universal Law (FUL) – "act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law" – as one formulation of such principle. According to many interpreters these arguments contain a "gap", for Kant would have concluded the FUL after considering it equivalent to the principle that one should always conform one's maxims to universal law. Nonetheless, critics argue that these principles differ significantly because they confer different moral statuses to the same maxim. Thus, Kant would not have adequately justified the FUL. This dissertation reconstructs the derivation of the FUL in the first section (in GMS 402) and the second section (in GMS 420-1) of the "Groundwork". I argue that Kant’s concept of autonomy (or self-legislation), introduced (even if tacitly) in the first section and completely spelled out in the second, warrants his move from the idea of conformity to universal law to the FUL, such that there is no gap in the derivations of this formula (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 19/21992-8 - The derivation of the formula of universal law in the groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals |
| Grantee: | Vinicius Pinto de Carvalho |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Master |