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| Author(s): |
Davi Heckert César Bastos
Total Authors: 1
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| Document type: | Master's Dissertation |
| Press: | Campinas, SP. |
| Institution: | Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas |
| Defense date: | 2022-12-15 |
| Examining board members: |
Lucas Angioni;
Breno Andrade Zuppolini;
Fernando Martins Mendonça
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| Advisor: | Lucas Angioni |
| Abstract | |
Aristotle develops a complex theory of science throughout the Posterior Analytics. Central to his conception of science is his theory of demonstration: scientific knowledge is structured in demonstrative syllogisms that explain by the appropriate cause why a given C is A. The explanation needs to bear an adequate kind of relation to the world, and must capture in a proper manner the causes [aitiai] that ground certain relations in reality. His theory of scientific demonstration seeks to structure how that scientific knowledge should be organized: in sound syllogisms with a complex predicative explanandum and an aitia, the middle term, which explains properly why the explanandum is what it is. I emphasize some topics of Aristotle’s understanding of causes, essences and necessitation. First, scientific demonstrations require not any causal relations but adequate causal explanations. Such adequate causal explanations must have a middle term B (which expresses the cause) coextensive with the major term A (which figures as the predicate in the conclusion). But such coextension is restricted to the domain of C items, that is, the minor term (subject of the conclusion) functions as a domain restrictor in the coextension between cause and what is caused. I argue that this is similar to J. L. Mackie’s causal field (Mackie, 1965), but Aristotle’s notion can overcome some difficulties that arise in Mackie’s theory. Second, Aristotle defends a real necessitation of the effect by the cause and a causal pluralism. I argue that such philosophical positions are stil relevant in contemporary philosophy, and I show how Ernest Sosa (1993) defended similar positions. Third, I defend that for Aristotle essences are not explained in modal terms, but modality is explained in essentialist terms. I show that this is also acceptable in contemporary philosophy, being a position held by Kit Fine (1994). Finaly, I show how Benjamin Schnieder (2006) takes an aristotelian position when defending a triadic notion of explanatory ontological dependence, and how Schnieder’s views can throw some light to Aristotle’s theory of primary causation. I aim to show in this dissertation that some aspects of Aristotle’s philosophy can be in fruitful dialogue with contemporary philosophy, and that such common ground (a) is relevant for the interpretation of Aristotle and the translation of his philosophy to our contemporary context, (b) situates Aristotle in a debate in which his positions are still plausible and defended by certain authors, (c) can throw light in the philosophical claims of the Aristotelian corpus (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 18/21898-9 - Essence and metaphysical necessity in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics Book II |
| Grantee: | Davi Heckert Cesar Bastos |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Master |