| Full text | |
| Author(s): |
Total Authors: 2
|
| Affiliation: | [1] Universidade Estadual de Santa Cruz. Departamento de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas - Brasil
[2] Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas - Brasil
Total Affiliations: 2
|
| Document type: | Journal article |
| Source: | Opin. Publica; v. 29, n. 2, p. 505-527, 2023-10-23. |
| Abstract | |
Abstract In Brazil, the president's party commands job positions and legislative proposals in the executive branch, demonstrating the effort to implement its agenda. However, a bill only becomes law after being passed by the legislature, where it is frequently changed in committees. Thus, the presidential party also seeks to gain command of these bodies. This article analyzes if and how this occurs. We use a descriptive analysis, with logistic regressions, and data from the Cebrap Legislative Database on the presidents and rapporteurs of legislative commissions (1995-2014). We demonstrate that the presidential party has more rapporteurs than their weight in the House, mainly for bills proposed by government. Its deputies preside over the committees that distribute the most rapporteurships and benefit their co-members in the assignments. The article contributes to analysis of executive-legislative branch relationships, and the administration of coalitions and confirms the importance of committees in the decision-making process. (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 19/02542-1 - Power sharing and control in Brazilian coalition Presidentialism |
| Grantee: | Benjamin de Oliveira Magalhães |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Master |
| FAPESP's process: | 16/10421-1 - The strength of the committees in Brazil: recruitment and distribution preferences |
| Grantee: | Vitor Lacerda Vasquez |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Doctorate |