Power sharing and control in Brazilian coalition Presidentialism

• Grant number: 19/02542-1
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Master
• Effective date (Start): July 01, 2019
• Effective date (End): April 30, 2021
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Political Science - Political Behavior
• Principal Investigator: Andréa Marcondes de Freitas
• Grantee: Benjamin de Oliveira Magalhães
• Host Institution: Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas (IFCH). Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Campinas , SP, Brazil
• Associated research grant: 16/14525-6 - Political institutions, patterns of executive-legislative relations and government capacity, AP.TEM

Abstract

The objective of this project is to understand the effective autonomy of the parties when they enter in the coalition, by identifying which factors influence the greater or lesser control of the ministers' proposals, that is, the greater or lesser control of public policies among the coalition government partners. The distribution of ministerial portfolios between the parties of the legislative branch, coalition formation process, involves distribution of power between the President party and the parties of the ministers. Although necessary for the approval of a political agenda, this process involves risks. One of these risks is that each minister follows his party interests and distances himself from the average preference of the other coalition partners. Because, even as partners in government, parties are still competing in the electoral arena. The literature (Martin and Vanberg, 2011; Freitas, 2016) has empirically identified mechanisms to control these risks, in the legislative arena, through changes in projects submitted by ministers. However, little is known about the how much autonomy the ministers have to implement their proposals and why some parties are more controlled than others. The analysis of the degree of autonomy of the ministers and the variables that influence the control between the partners offers explanations about the functioning of the relationship between the Brazilian Executive and the Legislative, as well as the decision making process. The analysis of the autonomy of the ministers and the variables that influence the control between the partners offers explanations about the functioning of the relationship between the Brazilian Executive and the Legislative, as well as the decision-making process. To identify the determinants of control among coalition partners, will be analyzed the relationship between ministers and rapporteurs between 1995 and 2018. The data used are part of the legislative database of CEBRAP. (AU)