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Campaign finance efficiency and party organization

Grant number: 17/27145-0
Support type:Scholarships abroad - Research Internship - Doctorate (Direct)
Effective date (Start): June 15, 2018
Effective date (End): October 10, 2018
Field of knowledge:Humanities - Political Science
Principal Investigator:George Avelino Filho
Grantee:Arthur Thury Vieira Fisch
Supervisor abroad: Fernando Daniel Hidalgo
Home Institution: Escola de Economia de São Paulo (EESP). Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV). São Paulo , SP, Brazil
Local de pesquisa : Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), United States  
Associated to the scholarship:16/16191-8 - Campaign finance efficiency and party organization, BP.DD

Abstract

The elections of federal representatives, according to the literature, although candidates could pursue throughout the whole state, are defined locally, due to the ability of candidates in raise support from municipal brokers, also known as "cabos eleitorais". This support can be achieved by two ways not necessarily mutually exclusive. The first one refers to local party organization. Through the party structure, the candidate and local brokers would exchange promises of mutual support to be realized in a long term. The second one refers to the payment of local brokers. In this scenario, the relationship between candidates and brokers tend to be a short term relation. For this reason, the trade between the two subjects would be mainly based of financial payments for the broker's services. From these assumptions and with the data from CEPESPDATA, this thesis will investigate the efficiency of resources campaign. To achieve this, three hypotheses will be tested First, candidates from parties with a denser network of local organizations will spend less efficiently. Second, candidates from newer parties tend to have more expensive campaigns. Third, within the same party, candidates with less affiliation time will spend less efficiently. Four, candidates that spend more inefficiently will be more likely to switch parties.