| Full text | |
| Author(s): |
Total Authors: 2
|
| Affiliation: | [1] Univ Estadual Campinas, Ctr Log & Epistemol, Campinas - Brazil
[2] Univ Valencia, Dept Filosofia, Valencia - Spain
Total Affiliations: 2
|
| Document type: | Journal article |
| Source: | PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY; DEC 2021. |
| Web of Science Citations: | 0 |
| Abstract | |
According to a recently developed family of relational views, whether two concepts C-1 and C-2 are the same is a matter of an external relation in which their tokens stand. In this paper, we highlight the chief contributions of Relationism in the elucidation of concept sameness, present a set of arguments to the effect that relational accounts of concept sameness fail to accommodate a substantive notion of concept publicity, and offer a diagnosis of this result. We conclude that the strengths of non-relational approaches will also need to be considered in order to fully capture what it means for a concept to be public. (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 20/11116-3 - Connecting Distant Minds |
| Grantee: | Matheus Valente Leite |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Post-Doctoral |